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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

JOYCE KNOWLDEN,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

No. 940379CA

GRANT R. KNOWLDEN,

:

Civil No. 934390096

:

Category 15

Defendant/Appellant.

ooooo
Comes

now

the

Appellee

to

the

above-captioned

matter

(hereinafter "Wife"), by and through counsel, and hereby submits
the following as her brief of Appellee herein:
JURISDICTION AUTHORITY
Husband has appealed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Decree of Divorce made and entered by the Third Judicial
District

Court

for

the

County

of Tooele,

State

of Utah,

the

Honorable William A. Thorne, Judge, presiding.
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
matter

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

§78-2a-3 (2) (i)

(1953,

as

amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
The matter below is a divorce action and this appeal is from
the final Decree of Divorce and certain provisions of that Decree
of Divorce, heard by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for

Tooele County, State of Utah, and, in particular those provisions
which awarded the Wife certain interests in real estate holdings
and which awarded alimony to Wife, and, including, the level of
alimony.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES, AND RULES, ETC,
There

is no

case

law

authority,

nor

statutory

authority

believed by Wife to be wholly dispositive or wholly determinative
of the issues raised on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on appeal in this case is an abuse of
discretion standard. In divorce proceedings, the appellate court
will "afford the trial court 'considerable latitude in adjusting
financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to
a presumption of validity. ' "

Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 542

(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) and Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988)).

Therefore, M[t]he trial court's findings of fact

are presumed to be correct".

Baker, at 542.

Accordingly, the

Court of Appeals has stated that "we view 'the evidence and all the
inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light most
supportive of the trial court's findings.'"

Baker, at 543 (citing

Gillmore v. Gillmore, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) and
Horton

v.

Horton,

695

P.2d

102, 106
2

(Utah

1984)).

Further,

" [f ] indings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."

Watson v.

Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Regarding the property division at issue, the appellate court
"will alter the trial court's property division 'only if there was
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in a
substantial

and

prejudicial

error,

the

evidence

clearly

preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."

Baker, at

543 (citing Watson, 837 P.2d at 5 and Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1146) .
Accordingly, appellant must show that the findings of the trial
court "are 'so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight
of the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.'" Baker, at 543
(citing Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(citations omitted); accord Watson, 837 P.2d at 6.
Finally, with regard to alimony, this Court has stated that it
"will not overturn a trial court's alimony ruling as long as the
court supports its ruling with adequate findings and exercises its
discretion according to the standards we have set."
Willey, 866 P. 2d 547, 550

(Utah Ct. App. 1993)

Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).

Willey v.

(citing Bell v.

Additionally, "the

trial court has broad discretion, and its decisions will not be
3

overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice."
Watson v. Watson, 837 P. 2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Schindler
v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This divorce action was tried before the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah, on January
20, 1994, The Honorable Judge William A. Thorne, presiding.

The

judge, among other things, entered orders regarding the disposition
of the marital estate and award of alimony to Wife.
The Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law from which the Husband appeals, were signed and entered by the
court on March 8, 1994.

Said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law and Decree of Divorce are attached hereto, designated as
Appendix "A" and Appendix "B," respectively.
Husband moved for a new trial, or, in the alternative, for an
Amendment to the Decree of Divorce.

Subsequent to hearing, the

trial court denied this motion by an order entered May 17, 1994. S
Said order is attached hereto, designated as Appendix "C."
Husband then moved for an extension of time within which to
file a Notice of Appeal and filed his notice on June 28, 1994.
Husband has appealed

the trial court's award of alimony and

division and distribution and characterization of the real property
of the parties.

Husband's brief was filed with the Court of
4

Appeals on November 23, 1994.

Wife moved for an extension of time

within which to file her brief, which was granted by the Court on
December 22, 1994.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married on September 10, 1978, in Elko,
Nevada.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, %2, Index 253).

The parties resided together continuously as husband and wife, but
for a brief period of separation in May, 1991. (Tr., p.7, 11. 1525, p.8, 11.1-17.)

The parties were married for sixteen years.

Wife was born June 9, 1932, and was 61 years of age at the
date of trial.

(Tr. , p. 6, 11. 17-19.)

Wife obtained a high school

diploma in 1949 and later took a class at a junior college in San
Antonio and some courses at Brigham Young University.
11. 6-9.)
work

(Tr., p.154,

While Wife had worked prior to her marriage, she did not

subsequent

to

the

marriage.

(Tr.,

p.155,

11.

1-7.)

Subsequent to the parties' separation, however, Wife worked parttime for her sister-in-law making quilts with a quilting machine
acquired by the parties during the marriage.
25.)

(Tr., p.155, 11. 9-

Wife's average monthly income from the quilting business was

approximately $300.00.

(Tr., p.157, 11. 5-9.)

Wife testified at trial that she believed that when she turned
62, she would be entitled to social security which she believed
would be approximately $348.00. (Tr., p.159, 11. 2-3.) Plaintiff's
5

monthly expenses were found to be $879.00 per month, excluding any
mortgage or rent payment (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf
Ul9f Index 245.)
Husband was employed by Kennecott Copper Corporation during
the marriage and until his retirement in 1985, at which time he
took an early retirement. (Tr. , p. 156, 11. 16-20) . The Husband had
a

total

net

retirement

income,

including

social

security

and

of $1,200.00 per month, less the deduction

Kennecott
for the

survivor benefit which he paid each month for the benefit of Wife.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^19, Index 246.)
survivor benefit paid each month was $44.21.
12.)

The

(Tr., p.216, 11. 2-

At the date of trial, husband was 65 years of age, having

been born October 15, 1928.

(Tr., p.222, 11. 24-25, p.223, 1.1.)

Husband had worked for Kennecott Copper Corporation for 25 (twentyfive) years and two (2) months, retiring on July 1, 1985. (Tr.,
p.223, 11.2-5. )
While the parties were married during a period of seven years
in which retirement accrued, the court found that, based upon the
award of alimony, Defendant Knowlden should be awarded all right,
title and interest in his Kennecott retirement. (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, 124, Index 244.)
At

trial,

Husband

testified

that

the

quilting

machine,

previously utilized by Wife during the period of separation to
6

supplement her income, was purchased with pre-marital funds in
March of 1993.

(Tr., p.242, 11. 17-21.)

Husband testified he

wanted the machine awarded to him. (Tr., p.243, 11. 1-3.)

Further,

the Husband testified that he purchased the quilting machine and
two bolts of material for $6,500.00 at that time and when asked if
he intended to use the quilting machine stated "Well it looks like
I'm going to have to have income from some source.

I am too old to

be employed by, who's going to hire a 65-year old man?"
p.244, 11. 7-11.)
the trial

(Tr.,

The quilting machine was awarded to Husband and

court found that Husband had an ability to earn an

additional $300.00 by virtue of the fact that he was being awarded
the quilting machine, which he had requested.

This finding was

based upon the fact that Wife had testified that she could earn
$300.00 per month from the use of that machine and had been earning
that sum during the pendency of the action.

The court found that

Wife would no longer have that money available to her, but Husband
would have the money available to him to add to his monthly net
income.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1l9, Index 246.)

During trial, Wife testified that she was willing to give the
quilting machine
instead.

to Husband

if he wanted

to pay

her

alimony

(Tr., p.162, 11. 5-8.)

The court ultimately awarded Wife $400.00 per month, as and
for alimony.

The court analyzed the parties' respective incomes
7

and found that Husband would have has $1,200.00 net income per
month from retirement and social security and $300.00 per month
from quilting income, for a total of $1,500.00 per month. Wife was
awarded a note receivable generating $120.00 per month, and a
rental property generating $325.00 per month for a total of $445.00
per month.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, fl9, Index

245, 255.)
Prior to and during the course of the marriage, the parties
acquired three parcels of real property.
Conclusions of Law, 1l5, Index 248.)
bifurcated,

as

Husband's

sister,

Grace

(Findings of Fact and
The divorce trial was
Poloskey,

was

a co-

defendant, and the trial court first addressed the issue of the
Husband's transfer of a parcel of property referred to as the
"Grantsville property," from Husband to his sister, Grace Poloskey,
and whether that constituted a fraudulent transfer. (Tr.. p.5, 11.
1-8.)

The court found that the "Grantsville property," known as

6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, was acquired by the Husband prior
to

the marriage,

that

he

paid

$2,500.00

for

the

land

in,

approximately, 1956, and that the land remained undeveloped until
the parties commenced building upon the property.
court

found

that

the Husband

and Wife

commenced

Further, the
building a

residence on that property in 1981, and, by their labor and "sweat
equity," built the residence, which fair market value at the time
8

of

trial was assessed

at $86,000.00.

Conclusions of Law, ^[6, Index 252-253.)

(Findings

of Fact and

The court also found that

on May 13, 1991, Husband transferred that property to his sister,
Grace Poloskey, for no money consideration and, based upon a number
of considerations and findings, found that the property had been
fraudulently conveyed by Husband to his sister and that, indeed, it
was marital property for purposes of disposition at the date of
trial.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^[6-11, Index

250-253.)
At trial, the Wife testified that in June of 1979, the parties
assisted in tearing down a 9,000 foot commissary building at Hill
Air Force Base to get lumber to build their home with.

They did

that from June through October, working practically every day,
including Sundays.

Wife testified that she would drive a two-ton

truck and haul materials and help gather materials daily.
testified

She

regarding the fact that the parties went to several

auctions and tore down several buildings to use for materials for
the

home.

(Tr. , p.11, 11. 1-11.)

Wife

testified

that

the

foundation of the home was put in place in 1982 and that the
parties continued to work every day on the home and jointly until
1985 when the home was complete enough to move
Husband had retired.

(Tr., p.11, 11. 11-14.)

into and when

Specifically, Wife

testified that she had "worked right along beside him in everything
9

we did.

And I might not have had the expertise or the strength to

do as much as he did, but I was sure just as tired and dirty at the
end of the day as he was."
Husband

had

testified

(Tr., p.11, 11. 15-18.)
that

$2,500.00 used to purchase the

in

addition

to

the

original

Grantsville lot, that he had used

retirement monies from Kennecott and sick leave and vacation pay to
assist in the building of the foundation and some of the other
construction.

(Tr., p.227-228, 11. 21-25, 11. 1-24.)

However,

Husband provided no evidence or testimony as to which portion of
those funds were pre-marital and which portions had accrued during
the parties' marriage.
The trial court specifically found that the funds of money
that the Husband claimed as pre-marital and which were used to
assist in the construction of the Grantsville residence, became comingled with marital funds and that any monies that may have been
separate property had lost their separate identity because of the
co-mingling.
252.)

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^6, Index

Further, the court found, separately, that the residence was

constructed

with the individual

efforts and

"sweat equity" of

Husband and Wife and, specifically, that the property had been
enhanced and augmented by the acts of Wife and found that its
entire value was a marital asset. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, 16, Index. 252.)
10

In addition to the "Grantsville property," the court found
that the parties resided together during the marriage at a home at
4801 South 4900 West, Kearns, Utah (the "Reams" property) . It was
acknowledged that the property was purchased by Husband prior to
the marriage and in, approximately, 1973, but transferred into the
names of both parties immediately subsequent to the marriage.

The

court found that the transfer of the property into both parties'
names constituted a gift.

As a separate finding and basis for

including it as a marital asset, however, the court found that the
parties resided in the residence, made payments of the mortgage,
made improvements to the property and that there was such a comingling of the pre-marital asset with marital funds that it was no
longer pre-marital.

The value of that property, at the date of

trial, was found to be $42,000.00, based upon the appraisal and
stipulation of the parties.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, 1[12, Index 250. )
Finally, the third property at 39 East Louise Avenue, Salt
Lake City, Utah (hereinafter the "Louise" property), was found to
have been acquired by the Husband in 1976 and titled in his name
during the marriage.

During the marriage, however, the mortgage

obligation on that residence was paid.

Further, the court found

that there were substantial improvements to the property, including
siding, new carpeting, thermal windows, and a new roof.
11

Further,

the court found that Wife assisted in scraping and repainting the
property, cleaning the property for the rentals, making curtains
and managing the property for rentals.

The court specifically

found that it was a marital asset for purposes of assessing the
marital estate and dividing the same, due to the acquisition of
equity over the period of the marriage and the augmentation and
enhancement of the property by Wife during the marriage and, on a
separate basis, because of the co-mingling of the marital funds.
That property was valued at $30,000.00.

(Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Lawf <|13, Index 249.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's property division in the instant case is
equitable

and

fair.

There

was

no

misunderstanding

or

misapplication of the law; neither was there a clear abuse of the
court's discretion.

Given the facts and circumstances of this

case, including the contribution of Wife to the enhancement and
augmentation of the properties in question and, given the age of
Wife

and

prospects

for

future

income

or

employment,

the

characterization of the marital estate and division thereof was
just.

Wife

contributed

extensively

to

the

maintenance

and

improvements of the properties and their value was enhanced due to
the

efforts

of

both

Husband

and

12

Wife.

Further,

there

was

substantial

co-mingling

and

any

pre-marital

monies

were

unidentifiable given the co-mingling.
The trial court's rulings and findings are adequate and the
award

of

alimony

is

fair

and

equitable

discretion on the part of the trial court.

and

not

an

abuse of

Wife's sole sources of

income are based on the trial court's property division and alimony
award and are essential to maintain Wife's ability to provide for
herself.

The court's imputation of $300.00 of income to Husband

was appropriate and supported by the testimony of both Wife and
Husband.
Wife
appeal.

The alimony award is equitable and should be upheld.
should be

awarded her attorney's

fees and

costs on

Given the clear weight of the evidence preponderating in

favor of Wife, and given

the needs

of Wife and

abilities of

Husband, it is fair and equitable that this Court award Wife her
attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE
DISTRIBUTION AND CHARACTER OF THE MARITAL ESTATE.

The trial court valued the marital estate at approximately
$162,107.00 and outlined assets as follows:
PROPERTY/ASSET

VALUE

Grantsville property
Kearns property
Louise property
Chevrolet Celebrity
Ford truck

$86,000.00
$42,000.00
$30,000.00
$1,325.00
$800.00
13

Ford mustang
Oldsmobile Firenza
Chevrolet Citation
Chevrolet Cavalier
Marcus Knowlden note receivable
Farm equipment
Liquid accounts at Key Bank Account,
Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah
Credit Union and the debt from Ms. Eyre
Power Tools and tools

$200.00
$975.00
$100.00
$100.00
$7,576.00
$1,000.00
$1,224.00
$3,500.00

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^15, Index 248.)
Husband has challenged the inclusion of the Marcus Knowlden
note receivable as a marital asset. However, the argument that the
note should be excluded from the estate is wholly contrary to the
evidence adduced at trial and by Husband.

Husband testified that

in 1978 he assigned a $10,000.00 promissory note to Wife.
p. 243, 11. 16-18.)

(Tr. ,

The money from that note was paid during the

marriage and continued to be paid, at the date of trial, at the
rate of $120.00 per month.
Law, 1J19, Index 246.)
keep that note.
clearly

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Further, Husband testified that Wife should

(Tr. , pp. 247-248, 1. 25 and 11. 1-7.)

transferred

into

the

name

of

Wife,

and

It was

appropriately

included as a marital asset for ultimate distribution between both
parties.
As part of the equalization of the division of the estate, the
court ordered Husband to pay a substantial portion of the marital
debt.

The court found that, in addition to the mortgage debt on

14

the "Louise" property,

the debts that existed were as contained on

Wife's Exhibit 8 and were listed as follows:

The

sum

Levitz
Bank One
Property taxes (Kearns)
Fire insurance (Kearns)
Utah State taxes
Debt to Shelly Eyre

$

Total

$1,693.00

was

offset

against

equalization of the same.
Law, 1|16, Index 247.)

the

546.00
437.00
297.00
179.00
103.00
113.00

marital

estate

and

in

the

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

In analyzing the distribution of the assets

and debts, the court was specific and assigned specific values to
each.

In 11l5, 16 and 17 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law (Index 247), the properties and debts were distributed as
follows:
PROPERTY/ASSET/(DEBT)

HUSBAND

Grantsville property
$86,000.00
Kearns property
Louise property *
Chevrolet Celebrity
1,325.00
Ford truck
800.00
Ford mustang
200.00
Oldsmobile Firenza
Chevrolet Citation
Chevrolet Cavalier
Marcus Knowlden note receivable
Farm equipment
1,000.00
Liquid accounts at Key Bank Account,
Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah
Credit Union and the debt owed
by Ms. Eyre
Power Tools and tools
3,500.00
Levitz
(546.00)
15

WIFE
42,000.00
26,914.00

975.00
100.00
100.00
7,576.00

1,224.00

Bank One
Property taxes (Kearns)
Fire insurance (Kearns)
Utah State taxes
Debt to Shelly Eyre
Second mortgage (Louise)

(437.00)
(297.00)
(179.00)
(103.00)
(113.00)
(8,245.00)

TOTALS

$ 82,905.00

$ 78,889.00

(one-half of estate equals $81,000.00)
*Louise property, $30,000.00, less first mortgage of $3,086.00
equals net 26,914.00.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf

11)15, 16 & 17, Index

247) .
Therefore, while striving to equalize the marital estate, the
Husband, in receiving the Grantsville property and other property
assigned to him and paying the debts assigned, received more than
one-half of the marital estate. As indicated above, the properties
awarded

to

him,

totaled

$82,887.00.

Husband

received

$4,000.00 more of the marital estate than did Wife.

over

His payment of

the debts, including the debts associated with the Kearns property,
which

included

taxes

and

insurance,

was

not

inconsistent,

particularly given the temporary nature of the Order on Order to
Show Cause, which was entered by Judge Brian prior to the trial.
The temporary order did not prohibit the court from adjusting the
assets and debts to equalize the marital estate.

Further, there is

nothing in the record that indicates any objection or challenge on
the part of Husband or his counsel at trial to wife's inclusion of
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the insurance and property tax debts as marital debts.

It was not

until the motion for retrial that the issue was raised by Husband,
through counsel. (Tr., p.308, 11. 5-13.)

However, given the fact

that those two debts total $282.00 and Husband received $4,000.00
more of the marital estate, it is certainly within the equitable
discretionary powers of the court to make that distribution.

See

Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1234 (Utah App. 1990), Burke v. Burke, 733
P.2d 133 (Utah 1987).
The Utah

Supreme

Court

has held

that

"[i]n dividing

the

marital estate, the trial court may make such orders concerning
property distribution and alimony as are equitable."

Newmeyer v.

Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987) (citing Utah Code Ann.
(1984 8c Supp. 1987)) (holding that wife's inheritance

§30-3-5(1)

being awarded as her sole property was proper) .
Wife has no means of income other than the property awarded to
her

and

the

Therefore,

alimony

the order

readjusting

of

the

awarded
that

same

to

her

at

Husband pay
subsequent

to

the

time

the minimal
a

of

trial.

debts, and

temporary

order,

is

appropriate.
Husband has argued that the court's award of the "Grantsville
property"

to him

and

the

award

of

the

"Louise" and

"Kearns"

properties to Wife is unfair and inequitable, and that he should
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have been given pre-marital

credit on two of the properties as

follows:
Grantsville property
(down payment of $2,500.00,
increasing in value to 9,500.00
at the date of appraisal)

$9,500.00

Sick leave and vacation benefits
Kennecott retirement benefits

7,000.00
12 , 000 . 00

Subtotal

$28,500.00

"Louise property"
down payment
two years' mortgage payments

$4,000.00
3,000 . 00

Subtotal

$7,000.00

Total

$35,500.00

It is appropriate to analyze each of those alleged pre-marital
monies or assets separately, but subsequent to an analysis of the
case law relating to pre-marital properties.
In the case of Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d
1987),

the

Court

stated

that

"[t]he

appropriate

1276

(Utah

treatment

of

property brought into a marriage by one party may vary from case to
case."

Id. , at 1277.

"In appropriate circumstances, one spouse

may be awarded property which the other spouse brought in to the
marriage.

The rationale behind this exception to the general rule

is that ' [m]arital property 'encompasses all of the assets of every
nature

possessed

by

the

parties,
18

whenever

obtained

and

from

whatever source derived.''"

Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5-6

(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820,
824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d
1076, 1078 (Utah 1988)) (holding wife's award of husband's premarital property was equitable).

I!

[T]he trial court may, in the

exercise of its broad discretion, divide the property equitably
regardless of its source or time of acquisition."

Watson, at 6.

In the case at bar, the trial court exercised its discretion
properly in awarding Wife the "Kearns" and "Louise" properties.
Any funds or properties that were pre-marital, lost their identity
as pre-marital property given the substantial evidence of the
contribution made by Wife

to each of

the properties, which

contributions enhanced and augmented their value. Regardless, the
Utah Supreme Court has held that pre-marital property may be
treated as marital property in appropriate circumstances. In Burke
v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133 (Utah 1987) (which held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to award husband a
portion of wife's inheritance), the Court stated:
"Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be
viewed as separate property, and in appropriate
circumstances, equity will require that each party retain
the separate property brought to the marriage. However,
the rule is not invariable. In fashioning an equitable
property division, trial courts need consider all of the
pertinent circumstances. The factors generally to be
considered are the amount and kind of property to be
divided; whether the property was acquired before or
during the marriage; the source of the property; the
19

health of the parties; the parties' standard of living,
respective financial conditions, needs, and earning
capacity; the duration of the marriage; the children of
the marriage, the parties' ages at time of marriage and
of divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage; and
the necessary relationship the property division has with
the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded.
Of particular concern in a case such as this is whether
one spouse has made any contribution toward the growth of
the separate assets of the other spouse and whether the
assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts
of the parties."
Burke, at 135.
It is important to note that the bulk of the assets of the parties
are made up of the three real properties, the substantial one of
which was awarded to Husband.

The most valuable property, the

"Grantsville" property, which was unencumbered, was awarded to
Husband free and clear.

The two substantially lesser properties

were those that were awarded to wife.

Certainly, this permits

Husband to continue enjoying the standard of living that the
parties enjoyed during the marriage, as he was being awarded the
marital residence.

As the quilting machine, which was the sole

source of Wife's earned income (Tr., p.157, 11. 1-9), was awarded
to Husband, Wife's only source of income was the Marcus Knowlden
note, paid at the rate of $120.00 per month.

The court found that

with the award of the Louise property to Wife, she would receive
another $325.00 per month rental income, so that she would have a
total net income of $445.00 per month.
Conclusions of Law, 1l9, Index 246.)
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(Findings of Fact and
Once Wife received the

alimony award of $400.00 ordered by the court, her total income was
$845.00.

The alimony is taxable income as well as the rental

income from the property.

Husband's $1,200.00 per month income

from social security and his Kennecott retirement was net income.
Therefore, while not subject to mathematical precision, it would
appear

that

the parties

would

be

in approximately

equivalent

circumstances, so long as Wife receives the rental income, and, as
long as Wife was not required to make a mortgage payment of any
substance.

The court awarded Wife two properties, both of which

are relatively humble properties, but one of which she can live in
to avoid a substantial monthly mortgage payment.

It is clear, that

the award of the properties allowed for an equalization of the
standard of livings of the parties.
It is important for this Court to note, as well, the ages of
the parties.

Both parties are in their sixties.

The assets

currently in their possession are likely to be the bulk of what
they will have at their death.

Neither would have a substantial

prospect of future income or employment.

As stated in Newmeyer,

"[t]he overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be
equitable - that property be fairly divided between the parties,
given

their

contributions

during

the

marriage

circumstances at the time of the divorce."

their

Newmeyer, at 1278

(citing Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986)).
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and

In a case somewhat similar to the facts of this matter, the
Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court's award of one-half of
the value of a recreational cabin to the wife was equitable, even
though the husband, had used a substantial amount of proceeds from
the sale of pre-marital property to finance the construction of the
cabin.

"The court found that the cabin was constructed during the

marriage by the parties 'working as a family, and drawing on their
earnings, the daily funds of all . . .'".

Preston v. Preston, 646

P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982).
Premarital property is similar to the inherited or gifted
property of one spouse.

These different types of properties are

often treated comparably in divorce actions and are therefore
analogous.

The trial court's broad discretion applies in these

types of cases as well.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that " [s]ignificantly, no
case has been found where this Court has reversed a trial court's
disposition of gifts or inherited property received by one party
during the marriage.

In almost every case, we have emphasized the

wide discretion trial courts have in property division and have
refrained from laying down any general rules for the disposition of
gifts and inherited property."

Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P. 2d

304, 307 (Utah 1988) (holding that the trial court's division of
property on a percentage basis was proper).
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In Mortensen, the Court outlined Utah law regarding gifts and
inheritances as follows:
"We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making
'equitable' property division pursuant to section 30-3-5
should, in accordance with the rule prevailing in most
other jurisdictions and with the division made in many of
our own cases, generally award property acquire by one
spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage (or
property acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse,
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its
value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her
efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement,
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby
acquiring an equitable interest in it, (referring to
Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1973) . . . or (2)
the property has been consumed or its identity lost
through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring
spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the
other spouse (referring to Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610
P.2d 326 (Utah 1980)) . "
Mortensen at 308.
As set forth in the facts of the case. Wife, in the case at
bar,

made

substantial

contributions

acquisition of the real properties
monies

that

were

pre-marital

to

the

preservation

in question.

were

not

readily

and

Further, the
separable

or

distinguishable as pre-marital and they were commingled with that
portion that was clearly marital.
In

light

of

the

foregoing,

the

Court

must

analyze

the

individual alleged pre-marital contributions for which Husband is
asking on offset.
$2,500.00

The Grantsville property was purchased with a

down-payment

Conclusions of Law#

by

Husband.

f6, Index 253.)
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(Findings

of

Fact

and

However, the land remained

completely undeveloped until the parties commenced building on the
property. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^[6, Index 253.)
An appraisal was performed on the property prior to trial in order
to evaluate the marital estate.

As part of the appraisal, Husband

attempted to break out the separate valuation of the land in that
appraisal, which, using the cost approach as argued by Husband's
counsel, valued that land at $9,500.00.

However, the land is not

separate from the home and out-buildings that have been constructed
with the "sweat equity" of both Husband and Wife.

The appraised

value of the property of $86,000.00 was the "market" valuation,
which includes both the land and the structures on the land. (Tr. ,
p.150, 11. 7-13.)
Further,

the

initial

$2,500.00

down

payment

in

1956 is

certainly too remote and has been overwhelmingly consumed by the
efforts of Wife in the preservation of the property.

As outlined

in the facts of the case, as to the Grantsville property, the Wife
testified that in June of 1979, the parties assisted in tearing
down a 9,000 foot commissary building at Hill Air Force Base to get
lumber to build their home with.

They did that from June through

October, working practically every day, including Sundays.

Wife

testified that she would drive a two-ton truck and haul materials
and help gather materials daily.

She testified regarding the fact

that the parties went to several auctions and tore down several
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buildings to use for materials for the home. (Tr. , p. 11, 11. 1-11.)
Wife testified that the foundation of the home was put in place in
1982 and that the parties continued to work every day on the home
and jointly until 1985 when the home was complete enough to move
into and when Husband had retired. (Tr., p.11, 11. 11-14.)

I

n

addition to the land value, Husband is alleging that he should be
given credit for two payments received, during the marriage, from
his employer, Kennecott.

First, he testified that in 1981 he

received a $7,500.00 lump sum payment of his sick leave and
vacation benefits.

However, there is no documentation of that

allegation, nor has Husband made any attempt to differentiate which
portion of that was marital and which portion was pre-marital. He
introduced no testimony from former personnel directors or any
individuals responsible for the maintenance and distribution of
those funds.
Likewise, Husband testified that prior to his retirement, he
received a lump sum of approximately $12,000.00 that was used for
a

variety

of

building

materials;

for which

he

provided

no

documentation or verification to trial the court tracing how it was
spent or whether it was spent on other bills or expenses or
maintenance of the family. (Tr., p.250, 11. 14-15, p. 251, 11. 125.)

It is telling that when questioned by Wife's counsel as to

whether Husband considered the retirement money to be his separate
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property

or

separate

funds

that

were

being

used

for

the

"Grantsville property" construction, Husband stated "most of it was
uh acquired pre-maritally.

I don't think I even thought of it one

way or the other whether it was singly, because Joyce and I were in
a cooperative effort in building the home." (Tr., p.251, 11. 2225.)
Certainly, the burden is on Husband to provide evidence and
proof to the court as to which portion, if any, was actual premarital and to provide the court sufficient evidence to find that
there was not commingling.

However, even if the court found that

the monies were not commingled, Wife's efforts and enhancement of
the property outweighs Husband's assertions that some portion of
those

funds

that

were

contributed

retained

their

pre-marital

nature.
As to the "Louise" property, Husband is requesting an offset
or credit for a $7,000.00 contribution to that property.

However,

that offset or credit was not requested at the time of trial.

At

the time of trial, Husband testified that he did pay a $4,000.00
down payment in 1976, but did not testify regarding the amount of
mortgage payments made up until the date of the parties' marriage.
(Tr., p.232, 11. 13-25, p. 233, 11. 1-20.)

It was the $4,000.00

down

the

payment,

alone,

that

was

raised

at

time

of

trial.

Husband's failure to raise the request for an additional $3,000.00
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offset at the time of trial should bar him from requesting that
relief at this juncture.
Further, as previously stated, there was substantial monetary
contribution and "sweat equity" that Wife put into this property as
well.

During the marriage, the mortgage obligation on that

residence was paid.

Further, the court found that there were

substantial improvements to the property, including siding, new
carpeting, thermal windows, and a new roof.

Further, the court

found that Wife assisted in scraping and repainting the property,
cleaning the property for the rentals, making curtains and managing
the property for rentals. The court specifically found that it was
a marital asset for purposes of assessing the marital estate and
dividing the same, due to the acquisition of equity over the period
of the marriage and the augmentation and enhancement

of the

property by Wife during the marriage and, on a separate basis,
because of the co-mingling of the marital funds. That property was
valued at $30,000.00.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

Hl3, Index 249.)
The ultimate goal of property division in divorce matters is
to make an equitable award. The trial court in this matter, in its
sound discretion, accomplished that ultimate goal.

Based upon the

facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court's award
should be affirmed.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE AWARD
OF ALIMONY.

The trial court awarded alimony to Wife in the amount of
$400.00 per month.
$1,500.00

This amount was based on Husband's earnings of

per month, which was based

on

$1,200.00

actual net

earnings from social security and retirement and $300.00 per month
imputed

earnings

from use of

the quilting machine

awarded

to

Husband.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1l9, Index 245

and 246.)

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[a]limony is to

be awarded after considering three factors: the receiving spouse's
financial condition and needs; the receiving spouse's ability to
earn an adequate income; and the providing spouse's ability to
provide support."

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987)

(citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 Utah 1985)).
The trial court clearly considered each of these factors in
awarding

$400.00

per

month

alimony

to

Wife.

First,

Wife's

financial condition is dependent upon the trial court's alimony
award and property division.

Wife has no ability to earn an income

and therefore cannot meet her monthly expenses without the alimony
award.

Wife's award of the "Kearns" property allows her to reside

in a home without the responsibility of paying a mortgage (because
the mortgage was paid in full during the parties marriage) , and
Wife's award of the Louise property allows her to earn a limited
income from the rental. However, without the $400.00 alimony award
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Wife is unable to meet her expenses. Accordingly Wife's financial
condition and needs demonstrate the propriety of the alimony award.
Further, as previously set forth in the statement of facts,
Wife's employment ceased at the time of the marriage for the
convenience of the marriage.
years

of

age

and

had

At the time of trial, Wife was 61

been

unemployed

for

sixteen

years.

Accordingly, Wife is unable to provide an adequate income to
herself without support and assistance from her spouse.
Husband has the ability to provide the support. Husband earns
a net income of $1,200 per month from social security and his
Kennecott retirement. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
1l9, Index 246.)

Wife was not awarded any interest in Husband's

retirement, despite the fact that the retirement is a divisible
marital asset pursuant to Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431 (Utah
1982.)

It is undisputed that the parties resided together for a

period of

seven years during Husband's Kennecott employment.

Further, Husband demanded the award of the quilting machine in
the property distribution.

(Tr., p.p.243, 11. 1-3.)

Despite

Husband's knowledge that his demand for the award of the quilting
machine would deny Wife's ability to provide an income for herself,
Husband, nevertheless, persisted.

Husband was awarded what he

asked for. Accordingly, the trial court appropriately imputed the
$300.00 per month to Husband as money he could earn through the use
of the machine.
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"The most important function of alimony is to provide support
for the [spouse] as nearly as possible at the standard of living
she

[or he]

enjoyed

during

the marriage,

[spouse] from becoming a public charge."

and

to prevent

the

Willey v. Willey. 866

P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at
1075 and English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)).
In Newmeyer

v. Newmeyer,

745

P.2d

1276

(Utah

1987) when

awarding alimony to the wife, the court took specific notice of the
fact that during the course of two decades of marriage, the wife
was employed only episodically, for brief periods, at low-paying
jobs.

Further, the wife did not have an opportunity to build up a

retirement

fund and did not receive interest

pension.

Additionally,

the husband

the wife.

This

had

better

future

than did

Newmeyer.

The parties were married sixteen years. Throughout that

was after

the

separation and

is quite

income

prospects

period of time Wife was unemployed.

case

in the husband's

similar to

The only income that she had

through

the use of

the quilting

machine, which Husband summarily demanded in the property division.
Further, Wife did not have an opportunity to build up a retirement
fund, nor did she receive an interest in Husband's retirement fund.
Husband has argued that the imputation of $300.00 per month
from income to be earned from the use of the quilting machine was
error. However, it was Husband's demands and individual statements
that required that imputation.

As set forth in the statement of
30

facts, when questioned, Husband indicated that he would be earning
income from the use of the quilting machine. (Tr., p. 244, 11. 711.)
In Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) the trial
court imputed income to the husband for purposes of determining
child support and alimony.

Husband appealed, citing insufficient

findings of fact to support the imputation.

The court held that

because husband had "acquiesced to the imputation of income at the
trial level" and his job history and current employment supported
the imputation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Similarly,

Husband

"acquiesced"

to the

imputation

of

the

$300.00 per month income from the quilting machine through his acts
and testimony.
It is clear that the trial court did not err in imputing an
additional

$300.00

per month

to Husband's

monthly

income

and

determining the alimony award according to that increased amount.
The

trial

court's

award

of

$400.00

per month

in alimony

and

imputation of income to Husband should be affirmed.
III. APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL.
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3(2) provides as follows:
"in any action to enforce an order of custody,
visitation, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense . . . "
(emphasis added).
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This Court has previously held that, pursuant to this statute,
"either party to a divorce action may be ordered to pay the adverse
party to prosecute or defend the action.
fees incurred on appeal."
163 (Utah App. 1989).

This includes attorney

Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162-

See, also, Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904

(Utah 1978) . Wife is also entitled to costs pursuant to Rule 34 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Inasmuch as Wife has been forced to defend the equitable
alimony award and property division on appeal, Wife should be
awarded attorney's fees and costs at the appellate level.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial
court's determination regarding alimony and distribution of real
property, including that alleged to be pre-marital. Further, it is
reasonable

that

this

Court

award

Wife

her

court

costs

attorney's fees on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this M

v

day of January, 1995.

CORPOR0N^fc'WlI&EXAMS,P.C.
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and

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF Wife were mailed, first class, postage prepaid,
to:

on this

MANNY GARCIA
Attorney for Husband
431 South 300 East, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
'

day of

, 1995.

33

APPENDIX "A"

3RD DISTRICT COURT-TOOELE

9U-1AR-3 PM3--W
FILED RY

P,

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOYCE KNOWLDEN,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and
GRACE POLOSKEY,

Civil No. 934300096

Defendants.
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial
before the above-entitled court on January 20, 1994, at the hour of
9:00 a.m., the Honorable William A. Thorne, Third District Court
Judge, presiding, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and being
represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the Defendant,
Grant R. Knowlden, being present in person and being represented by
counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the Defendant, Grace Poloskey, being
present

in

person

and

being

represented

by

counsel, J.

Duke

Edwards, and the parties having been sworn and having testified and
having

presented

exhibits

and

evidence, and

the court

having

reviewed the Plaintiff's memorandum and heard the arguments of
counsel, and based thereon, the court now makes and enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff is now and has been for a period or more

months immediately prior to the filing of the complaint in this
action a resident of Tooele County, State of Utah.
2.

That the parties Joyce Knowlden and Grant R. Knowlden are

husband and wife, having been married on September 10, 1978, in
Elko County, Nevada,
3.

That the Defendant, Grace Poloskey is a resident of

Tooele County, State of Utah, and the sister of the Defendant,
Grant R. Knowlden.
4.

That irreconcilable differences have arisen between the

Plaintiff and the Defendant Knowlden which make continuation of the
marriage impossible.
5.

That

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

Knowlden

have had

no

children born as issue of this marriage and none are expected.
6.

Real property located at 6000 North Old Lincoln Highway,

Grantsville, Utah, was acquired by Defendant Knowlden prior to the
marriage.

Defendant Knowlden paid $2,500.00 for the land in,

approximately, 1956, and the land remained undeveloped until the
parties commenced building upon the property.

Plaintiff and

2

000256

Defendant Knowlden commenced building on the property and improving
the property on or about 1981, and by their labor and "sweat
equity," built the residence located at that property, which is
valued at $86,000.00, the current fair market value. The funds of
money that Defendant Knowlden claims as premarital and which were
used to assist in the construction of the Grantsville residence
became co-mingled with marital funds and any monies that may have
been separate property of Defendant Knowlden lost its separate
identify because of that co-mingling.

Further, the residence was

constructed with the individual efforts and "sweat equity" of the
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden.

This Grantsville property was

enhanced and augmented by the acts of the Plaintiff and its entire
value became a marital asset.
7.

That on or about May 13, 1991, Defendant Grant R.

Knowlden transferred

the Grantsville property to his sister,

Defendant Grace Poloskey, for no money consideration.

Since that

time, the Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden have continued to reside
in the property and treated the property as their own, though the
property remained in the name of Defendant Knowlden's sister,
Defendant

Poloskey.

Defendant

Poloskey

paid

the

taxes and

insurance at various times subsequent to the transfer, but was
reimbursed

those sums by monthly

payments made by Defendant

3
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Knowlden and or Defendant Knowlden and Plaintiff, which Defendant
Knowlden sometimes referred to as "rents."
8.

That the Defendant Poloskey testified that she had not

lost any money out-of-pocket as a result of the transfer of the
property. Further, Defendant Poloskey testified that she had held
the real property subsequent to its transfer to protect it for the
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden. Defendant Poloskey's conduct is
consistent with an agency theory, in that she held the property in
trust for her brother, Defendant Grant R. Knowlden.
9.

That at the time of the transfer of the Grantsville

property from Defendant Knowlden to Defendant Poloskey, Defendant
Knowlden had an actual intent to delay, hinder or defraud a
creditor, in that he testified that he had transferred the property
because of the threat of a lawsuit by a granddaughter.

The fact

that the Plaintiff's divorce action had not been filed does not
prevent Plaintiff from claiming a fraudulent transfer pursuant to
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.

The fact that the transfer

was made to avoid a lawsuit from a victim in a prior assault,
rather than to avoid a divorce lawsuit on the part of the Plaintiff
is irrelevant to the statute.
10.

Under U.C.A. §25-6-5(a) and (b) , the court finds that

Defendant Grant R. Knowlden fraudulently conveyed the property

4
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located at 6000 North Old Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah, to
his sister, Defendant Grace Poloskey.
11.

For purposes of dividing the marital estate, the current

value of the Grantsville property should be used rather than the
value of the property at the date of its transfer on or about May
13, 1991, as prayed for by Defendant Knowlden.
12.

The Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden resided together

subsequent to their marriage at a home located at 4801 South 4900
West, Kearns, Utah.

That property was purchased by Defendant

Knowlden prior to the marriage, and in, approximately 1973, but
transferred into the names of Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden
subsequent to the parties' marriage. The transfer of said property
into joint tenancy constituted a gift of the premarital property to
Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden.

Further, during the marriage,

Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden resided at that residence, made
payments on the mortgage and made improvements on the property,
including repainting and carpeting.
premarital

asset with marital

Co-mingling occurred of this

funds.

Further there was an

enhancement of the property by the acts of the Plaintiff.
property is a marital asset.
date

The

The value of that property, at the

of trial, is $42,000.00, based

upon the appraisal and

stipulation of the parties.

5
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13.

Prior to the marriage and in 1976, Defendant Knowlden

purchased a property located at 39 East Louise Avenue, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
marriage.

That property

remained

in his name during the

During the marriage, the mortgage was paid.

Further,

during the marriage, Plaintiff and Defendant Knowlden put siding
and new carpeting on the property as well as thermal windows and a
new roof.

Further, the marriage, Plaintiff assisted in scraping

and repainting the property, cleaning the property for the rentals,
making curtains for the property and managing the property for
rentals. The property is a marital asset for purposes of assessing
the marital estate and dividing the same due to the acquisition of
equity over the period of the marriage and the augmentation and
enhancement of the property by Plaintiff and the co-mingling of the
marital funds with the property.

The property is valued at

$30,000.00, pursuant to the evidence presented at trial and the
testimony of the Plaintiff.
14.

The court finds that the power tools have a value of

$3,500.00. Plaintiff testified that the power tools and equipment
were valued at $7,385.00, but that testimony was based an amount
that was provided to her by another individual which sum she did
not think was correct and to which she added some things in order
to come up with that value. Defendant Knowlden valued the tools at
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approximately

$3,500.00

and

the

court

finds

that

value

more

convincing.
15.

The Plaintiff and Defendant's marital assets, less debts,

are valued at $162,107.00, and as follows:
PROPERTY/ASSET

VALUE

Grantsville property
Kearns property
Louise property
Chevrolet Celebrity
Ford truck
Ford mustang
Oldsmobile Firenza
Chevrolet Citation
Chevrolet Cavalier
Marcus Knowlden note receivable
Farm equipment
Liquid accounts at Key Bank Account,
Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah
Credit Union and the debt from Ms. Eyre
Power Tools and tools

$86,000.00
$42,000.00
$30,000.00
$1,325.00
$800.00
$200.00
$975.00
$100.00
$100.00
$7,576.00
$1,000.00
$1,224.00
$3,500.00

The above-referenced values are based upon the testimony of the
parties, stipulation of the parties, appraisals or other evidence
adduced at trial.
a.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the Kearns property,

the Firenza, the Cavalier, the Citation, the Marcus Knowlden note,
the Key Bank Account, Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah Credit
Union and the debt owed by Ms. Eyre.

The total of the marital

estate thus initially awarded to Plaintiff is valued at $51,975.00.
16.

Defendant Knowlden

should be awarded the Grantsville

property, the Celebrity, the Ford truck, the mustang, the power
7

equipment and tools and

farm

Knowlden

following

should

pay the

equipment.

Further, Defendant

debts:

as set forth on

Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, and as follows: Levitz $546.00, Bank One
$437.00, property taxes (Kearns property $297.00), fire insurance
(Kearns property 179.00), Utah State taxes $103, and the debt to
Shellie Eyre $113, which total $1,693.00.
17.

An

equal

division

of

the

marital

Plaintiff to receive, approximately, $81,000.00.

estate

requires

To equalize the

estate, Plaintiff should be awarded the Louise property valued at
$30,000.00, less the first mortgage.

The first mortgage owing to

Lomas Mortgage should be paid by the Plaintiff and the second
mortgage owing to Lomas Mortgage should be paid by Defendant
Knowlden.

That division is based upon the representations of

Defendant Knowlden that the second mortgage

is approximately

$8,245.00, with a monthly payment of $249.72 and that the first
mortgage is approximately $3,086.00, with a monthly payment of
$97.00.

The total award to Plaintiff of marital property is

approximately $79,000.00, which is approximately one-half of the
estate and provides Defendant Knowlden some credit for the original
down payment made on the Grantsville property.
18.

It is reasonable that the building materials located at

the Grantsville property be sold and that Defendant Knowlden insure
that those be sold and that Defendant Knowlden obtain two estimates
8
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from two different appraisers as to what they think the property
can sell for and sell the building materials to the highest bidder.
The money received should then be divided equally between the
parties, one-half to each.
19.

Defendant Grant R. Knowlden is retired and has total net

income of $1,200.00, which

includes

social security and his

Kennecott Retirement income, less the deduction for the survivor
benefit which he pays each month for the benefit of the Plaintiff.
In addition, Defendant Knowlden has the ability to earn an
additional $300.00 by virtue of the fact that he is being awarded
the quilting machine, which he requested and which should be
awarded to him.

Plaintiff testified that she could earn $300.00

per month from the use of that machine and has been earning that
sum during the pendency of this action.

The Plaintiff will no

longer have that money available to her, but Defendant Knowlden
should have that money available to him to add to his monthly net
income. The Plaintiff's monthly income is comprised of $120.00 per
month which she receives from Defendant Knowlden's son, Marcus
Knowlden, which is a note receivable owed to her.

Further, with

the award of the Louise property to her, Plaintiff will receive the
sum of approximately $325.00 per month, for a total net income of
$445.00 per month.

Based upon the respective incomes of the

parties, it is reasonable that Defendant Knowlden pay Plaintiff
9
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permanent alimony in the sum of $400.00 per month.
not equalize the parties' income.

That sum does

The court questions whether

Defendant Knowlden will, in fact, make use of the quilting machine
and it is anticipated that in the near future, Plaintiff will
qualify for social security benefits.

Four hundred dollars per

month is reasonable based upon Defendant Knowlden's ability to pay
and the Plaintiff's needs.

The Plaintiff's monthly expenses are

minimally $879.00 per month, without a mortgage or rent payment.
The Plaintiff will have $448.00 net per month and the Kearns
property which will provide her with a place to live, rent free.
The $400.00 is within Defendant Knowlden's ability to pay and,
clearly, the Plaintiff needs that amount in order to survive.
20.

Defendant Grace Poloskey testified that she is holding

approximately $7,000.00, representing fire insurance proceeds paid
to her as the title holder to the Grantsville property. The court
does not have authority to re-claim those assets as Defendant
Poloskey had a contract with the insurance company and the court
does not have authority to retrieve those sums.
21.

That the personal property acquired by the parties should

be divided according to Exhibit 10, attached hereto, designated as
Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference, expect for the
disputed items set forth on Exhibit 10b, which should be divided as
follows:
10
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TO THE PLAINTIFF: Small tables, candelabra and clock, washer
and dryer to Plaintiff, the screw gun, refrigerator in the
pantry, the dresser lamp, the large mixer, the sander, onehalf of the knives and the Kirby vacuum.
TO DEFENDANT:

Large tables, antique chair, the luggage,

refrigerator in kitchen, the pattern cabinets, the stained
glass grinder to the Defendant, one-half of the knives, and
the other vacuum.
22.

That Defendant Knowlden should insure that the second

mortgage obligation on the Louise property be removed from that
property.
23.

Defendant Knowlden should be awarded the Metropolitan

Life Insurance policy.
24.

Based upon the award of alimony, Defendant Knowlden

should be awarded all right, title and interest in his Kennecott
retirement.
25.

Each party should pay his or her own attorney's fees and

costs, as, with the division of the property and the award of
alimony, neither party is in a better position or better able to
carry that financial burden.
26.

Defendant Grant R. Knowlden should be enjoined and

restrained from coming around the Plaintiff at her residence or
from telephoning Plaintiff or having any contact with Plaintiff
11
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whatsoever.

Further, Defendant Knowlden should be enjoined from

harassing, annoying or physically touching or abusing Plaintiff.
27.

Plaintiff

should

remove herself

from the Grantsville

property no later than March 31, 1994. Until the Plaintiff removes
herself from the Grantsville property, Defendant Knowlden will be
permitted access to the property, but only for the limited purposes
of the construction of the firewall pursuant to the earlier court
Order on Plaintiff's Motion in Re: Contempt.
28.

Defendant Knowlden should cooperate with Plaintiff in

providing Plaintiff with any and all documents necessary to obtain
information regarding the rental of the Kearns property, including
lease documents.
29.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver any

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
property of the parties pursuant to the decree entered in this
action.
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court has

jurisdiction

over the parties of this

action and the subject matter of this action.
2.

That

a Decree

of

Divorce

should

be

awarded

to

the

Plaintiff on the basis of irreconcilable differences, the same to
12
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become final immediately upon being signed by the Court and entered
by the Clerk.
3.

That said Decree of Divorce should be in conformance with

the foregoing Findings of Fact.

2-

DATED this 2L- day of

sMc

., 1994.
BY THE COURT

A-y

TT-, THORNE
WILLIAM'A.
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JIMI MITSUNAGA
Attorney for Defendant Knowlden
DATED:

/

vi

Q^

s

J. DUKE EDWARDS
Counsel for Defendant
Dated:
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY AND MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the Plaintiff herein, and that I caused
the attached FINDINGS OF FACT to be served upon Defendants by
causing a true and correct copy of the same to be hand-delivered
to:
Jimi Mitsunaga
Attorney for Defendant Knowlden
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope
addressed to:
J. Duke Edwards
Attorney for Defendant Poloskey
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84177
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-paid
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
M

day of

<6V3f[XIL\^j

, 1994 •

A&^/rw?
Secretary
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Notes for Mary Joyce

NHLLS-I

i Jan 1980
SEWING ROOM
Aid^e a k4JJ£tsij4<xigi^iSf '

Lac e s

'

K

' /

and Notions

/ C u l t o n P a t L j n q ' ~ ^UJO bfiXT*
U^feoa%-~Cais.efH a n d S h e l v e s «. </
6urtj^fcHLx\q ,^Mac h i nfe
^ r n m a
Sewing Machine '
u?fe'eFnette g e r g e r
^
/ U c r r n i n a ' l n d u s t r i a l Sewing M a c h i n e
.
' ujfc
p a t t e r n C a b i n e t s " and J?at t e r n s J ^ - £ £ f ^ ' ^ ^
>Baoks and Magazine^
^
0
y
G u i l t " P a t t e r n s e t c . CA*JU u ^ k I W ^ V ° | J 1

^

<

%
J

{/Small Paper C u t t e r
^Roller
Ironer;
^5M O v e r h e a d P r o j e c t o r ,
/ H o m e s t e a d Hand Q u i l t i n g

Fr4nie

2 5 0 Ga_l A c g u a n u m s
P/^
i
2 F f a f f T 3 0 ^ e w i n g M a c h i n e s Una*-«***-•
C h a i r s t o o l d D i n i n g Room S4?t
yLatge
Faper C u t t e r
Great

Room

^ T V a n d VCR
2, F c C o u c h S e t .
. "/
jZ^"N
(
K
2* T u r q u o i s j * R e c l i n e r s V ) jgb£sMQ~ *~%
i Wood C o f f e e T a b l e s ^ ^ ~"~~
/Round Glass^Top Coffee Table
1 l a r g e O v a l TabJ^e F o r m i c a T o p /§JU~U- h^u UOMJAH^ <**-, .J 0 D£rfcf
U ^ S m a l l R o u n d T a l ^ J L e s ^ w i t h F o r m i q a ^ T o p s / <^u ( ^ ^ n u . 0 / ^ e
V
C Antique Chairs r¥cin11 y'Tecovered
low.Lamp/
Dining Room Table & C h a i r s w i t h M a t c h i n g B u f f e t H»
Or l e n l T a l Rujjg
Ex^ass l i t e m s ' i n B u f f e £
Z*S2\
^ j r i Y e r plated items i n puivfet
^ a s e b & W h a t n o t s a n d j i c ^ n ^ B u f . f p V O k * ^ t^* 4 **
K/

^ 6 / t e n O c c a s i o n a l C h a i r ^xMy^ CM^*
> / S m a l l VCR C a b i n e t
/ C h a i r a t Pianp
v?Z^Green/white Flowerj Arrngement
^ v £ * - ftou
l/Large Flower Arrangement
s / L a r g e ^ ^ ^ L F l o w e r _ A r £ a n g « i n e n t Gr
^ S e t ' C a n d e T a b r a & cflactf
*~
>/Christus .Statue
^Pwl Umbrella Stand
L : r g e 2 Way B o o l ; c a s e
^C^Btlcn T a b l e
wit
ower^Arrangement
- ( T i r b y V a c u u m C l e a n e r '} yrjkliiju
^[x&Qg
>Round T r a m p o l i n e Jogger
C u r t a i n s aHd_Drapes

Notes tor Mary Joyce HALLS-1
1

JCAI.

198U

F,

MASTER

Satellite" systeT

- aZ*-VX<4~ ±*

BEDROOM

tf£)

rL,6rrJ&&

^ovebeat
• 6 , I a n d B e d r o o m S e t — <Luxw*>L*>^
/Qriiental^&Ujg U^C(Tedar
CTfg^t^^
<2^i-g^ps ^ x t h o u t shades
IT f\
^ n t i q u e Ster«a i
^2 C u r i a C a b i n e t s w i t h A n t i q u e ^ / t e m s
^ D r e s s e r ^ L a m p A\ i r A £

M

^=^m^r^i
/Jewelry
^5

•**,;^^-\««.~,b^

B o x e s — m * i / * ^ * cr*£**« ^ ^ n i T o

PlllOWS^

""

L+* UAJGA

H

,

Lnth+t^J-

/ C u i f t a i n s ^ n d ^ D r a p e s CM^Lrv* f** ("**>-([*"
^^s^T^B^th
' c i a t h e s~ "Hamper
F i l c h e n 3 Basan^SilnP
hLhler^
Wood b u r n i n g S t o v ^

*+**¥

^ b r a s ^ t o w e l r a c t s * n d t i s s u e d i s p e n s e r - tf^A^UjL fo N****^
^ a h ^ " " " ^ 7 r a f ted~~by m e : o p a l n e c k l a c e o r ^ s i I v e r ^ c h a m ^ ( ( p i s s i n g )
/ P e a r l & Diamond r i n g
(missing)
/l
s i l v e r r o p e c h a i n necl- l a c e s
(missing)
/ H a n d c r a f t e d o p a l n e c k l a c e s for— J a c k - ( m i s s i n g )
BLACh

2 Cf utrn

BEDROOM

Lamps

Stci- t^o C a b i n e t
B „ Lr cv Dr e ^ s e i
/ B F ^ ^ ^ i F T ^ n
parage)
^ f e t t r e s s ~]^<" BQ_X^^S p r I n g s (_ir\. g a r a g e )
2 N i g h t ~ S t a n d s ( i n Garage})
^/W^er^ggcL^Frame ( i n Garage)-^
P i l l o w s (6)

pl!A«l*fca«atef riOmJBamtji)
^SSTSSprJJjS B a g a ^ U « V ) c » e n , ^ - l ,

feathery

White t n ^ k g t j ^
C l o c K and Radio
VCR R e c o r d e d T a p e s
CLtr t a i n s , D r a p e s ' a n d m a t c h i n g B e d s p r e a ^ l
N
' S n i o w h G o l d Lamp w i t h o u t S h a d e
S e f l T i r r r e l C e r a m i c CXiTB'yr^Q'h't^aTn^ei/I SmcalJ. B r a s s r o u n d b o x w i t h l i d
^4l£EJrT^qu©-Flower-^M^e '
2 &i a s s W a l l

Scorfce^

GREEN BEDROOM
C h e r r y w o o d -Bed

frame
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Notes

for Mary Joyce nnLLS-l

1 Jc*n 19B0
bole Springs and Mattress. r ' M
Bedroom Set ;*(Gr.an ts ) y r i^
PfETOTre "v
T y p e i V r "Tter^ ^
v / S , t a m e d U a l a ' s s * G r i n d e A 4ilj[4i6
L/Biu^~~Bonnet P a i n t i n g
^ H a n g i n g Lamp
Pink ? G r e e n & Y e l l o w
liray** B l u e BecTs^pT^eaq^
eacock Tapestry
VvCR T a p e C o v e r s

Bedspread

/ S c h o o l Desk
Boit^of G r a n t s S u i t s
2' F i l l o w f
C u r t a i n s and D r a p e s .
/Unfinished^red/black/greef^Duilt
U n f i n i s h e d Spinning Spools.jQuilt
Lone ^Star ^ Q u i l t ^
^'Fuscia & Black Q u i l t ^
}
^^^$rj)S!L*
S1 e e p i n Q&Bjlb
Gi a \ B l u e Q u i 1 t
Whi t e S l a n t e I:
ht_d E l t f C - t r i c B l a n t e t
f h_-xl-l S l e e p i n g b a g
SMALL BATHROOM
Pint

Hamper,

C > > ^ 7

/ S h e l l Soap D i s h
/B.-ith A r t i c l e s
*
/Medicines
' '^/
<•' G o l d W a s t e P a p e r B a s i e t

^

UTILITY

^ ^ ^

ROOM ( c u r r e n t

/ M i c r o Wave
-,
*>
A^
rXL
Large J a a s t^r
^
"""
'
\ / 3 m a l l T o a s t e r aZ>4HL££aW:
/ C a n QpefTer_( i n s t a l l e d b e l o w c a b i n e t : )
,
y/j»Ash^r
«/7 D r y e r > \ (Wwt^vw"U>WtiV t v ^ f e ^ t ^ ^
v/t^tove^
"/Drafting Table
/ T o a s t e r O v e n (Xmas^ p r e s e n t )

/l^Lt&^.M4tfS?7

^ H ^

^

^

^
C^^^T0^
AUUiw
tUfth>+~

d*"™**

kitchen)

/.^c
^ c < <L
i

S^\^

/ F o t s «6LEftOJ?y ^v W - .
.
.
h o t s & P a n s n m g a r a g e ) j v e^OV-^
Stoneware Dishes
/
i J o F i t a l - e "l2..PJ.ac'e? ! S T, e*ETing D i s h e s
0ther~ST1 verware

t^C P-*^»^*0

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 0

&+-'

Notes

f o r liary Joyce

HALLS-1

1 J a n 1980
/ b o l d *~Silvierwara
U n i v e s & - C o o k i n g - U t e n s i l s jfSA
„f,sy%~

0Wl$

LJann^ngTKe111 e a ( 1 e a c h l t /
'Whelft G r i n d ! r
uicer
aerving Bowls Refrigerator
SoTaT-Hhleating Unit £

2

NEW b ITCHEN

/
/

Booth Table?
^ White WicPer Chairs

"*f WhTt^Tt^^T^~^CRaTi rs4

.

.

/Rfefi igerator
- «L.IY^*i a|M««A»^^l*j^^
/Freezer
H ' /<*-<^u*- ^t-U^v H^ b-***~*rfi
2 Plastic Water Containers I ^>^/
2. Back Packs in pantry^ / \ y
x
Glasses im pantry
l^
Portable 5" TV j< Radio,
L^cH^ge 2 "side Bool' case^
/Corner Divider for Bootcase^
^BTacTC Greeting Card Cabinet

.^
* ^^

OLD SEWING ROOM
r Computer & P r i n t e r
2^£rrtTi a que g r e e n Lamps w i t h o u t

shadesi

/ T o o l s & BQTTSing T l a T t e r i a l s h
Records
(Betty;s)
O t h e r R e c o r d s •*• £ T f c v ^ L ^ p t * *- p £ * W
/BOO^
C^ t ^ ^ V
^
A 2 H a l f C i r c l e ^ T a b l ^ s w ^ •& f k
^ M a n u a l Wheat G r i h d e r
J T y p e w r i t e r ^>^fCLu/i-»
/ F i l i n g Cabinet (Metal)
r

/euitar (gift)'
^y/Small R e v o l v i n g Fan r ( has s i n c e
/,5 Ga'I^"Heavy \(\ 1 urninum~~Ffot
j^aYfntng J u i c e r

J

F n e u m a t i c T ' A i r Wrench ,
C a m e r a v E q u 3 p f n e n t " (Granfts)
Skil-~Saw
.
i
^ M ^ ^ ^ i S S ^ r j J ^ ^ f ^
******
b o V j t c f l lJ^pij-Qlc^

disappeared)

w

^
0
")
\:x£w^-^*-=n~v^c t ;

i
^Mr -

Elec". Boxes

ggffgfrCT^gqgrsL

n nftp '•'? /

Notes for Mary Joyce H A L . L S - 1
1 Jdii 1980

Pc

Hand Had- Saw
^luetic Drill
£UJ: of Elec Drill Bits
Electric Staple Gun
F ipe Wr ei ich
1 / 4 u f w»utt boic 16 p n a i l s
B l a u l - >i W h i l e P a i n t i n g
C h i I d S c h o o l Ded<
FdhjjOiuc Audio Flayer
Til > Sn i

(galv.)

i*l

JJ-5

Set uf Handy Man Set Encyclopedias
Sheet "Roct Tape_Gui$i
%
bun 'o f" JB 'Tracl' T a p e ^
Old Cassette & 'Recorder^Playqf
hland Planer
Large"Hand Plane
I 'Square ^
v'UHF/VHF Converter Model UVC
^Gibralter Amplifler
/Fresz-D-Tectar
Yellow ..Handle Hand Sart
r» Cal Flat finish Sealer
1 Gal Late;; Satin Enamel (5 g a l . bucket)
GE Solid State Stereo (Doesnt work)
L_Qt U^QUid S e v m
rh Staaned Glass Lamp Shade
'/Pencil Sharpener
STORAGE

A

SHED

Boa t JP/A/V... 3

b^t>Qaq^Mp.tdr^lj^4
E l e v a t o r Motor
h e r n

i^i*Ji^ai
I Lres

collector

(Water

HeaterW;^Jje^tMgi<chg^in~^±cbe(i ]
•-must*- . -„

-_ c «. wj« !__,»». .A... »-SuVj^l<J=«.t^|l^f,iS?Ca»»« y

- ' Lumber (mo t l y 2:; 12)
Car Engines
Ccu i ranaini ssi an
B e e s uf nails
NeLal, Locter fiJLled with electrical paraphanel Ja

Lhain^Bloc^

idsP^^'i

i;6or s
/
lAd Fire Ha^es
l/hetal Ornamental Railings from Old Elevators
^6*
Ceramic Molds V * * 4 0 ^ m i ^ /
S O I J U OaP K c u h n g b from 0a^ Bannisters
Numerous other, items buried too deep to see
STORGE SFACE UNDER BEDROOM WING
Ulo68 xllo cj^er with "'Cam Col lection
/(one^dimes, ;buffaio jiic^ els^fr^Wheat pennies)
1
v"/V
9~
5 gaal
f o o d sstorage
t o r a g e 'wheat
w h e a t iL
/ > f ^LU
tLl/
- 5
a l containers
c o n t a i n e r s ^food
JKuKes o f B l a c P P l a s t i c
He*taTl,:"drairr p i p ^ *
r.ttZJ..

Flumbing

Pipe

00G23t>

far

Notes
1 Jan

Mary Joyce HALLS-1

1980

Tcilets
jpri-g^t^
Urate Satellite Receiver

f^^^eF^T~S~TtT^t5
Rugs^

Aid Cabinets

(approic.)

Water S o f t e n i n g Appliance
(jrfiM^
MuirieroLij o t h e r i t e m s b u r i e d t o o d e e p

?
to

see

SHACh
/
..
bo;: s p r i n g s
LU/.OJ of F r u i t
i m r b a g e cans
TLIIJ

Out

Cabinet

£ Preserves
f u l l o r Oal'

13eu

with

2 Saddle,,

Wood B u r n i n g

Railings
^ ^ .

Misc.

&^_

items

p ^

(charcoal,

S^^Jj^^

Stove

U—-

chemicals

etc.)

^
BASEMENT

t-ree:er.
H a b l u Saw F i p e B e n d e r
(Greenlee)
eat Vents*
&P U s T i c F l u m b i n g
Pipes
Eo;; o
o rr I n t e r c o m W i r e

Audio SpeaP ers
eed Spreader
£'orta Potty
,ileed <* Branch
Shredder
14 Cans 1/2 pint Varnish
Metal Loci-ers filled with chemicals, ,f l a w e r ^ plan t oowders,
lawn sprmi- reF**sr"r*boal' s*^etc .
Wood Shelves
Liutal Shelves b Uprights
/p Gal Containers
/buLide TV Antennas
/wood Mouldings
/ycunbird Sprinl' ler
(pop up etc. js
/Drafting Table
SoTTcf^QaJ^.baTQnlster (Paid $30£>)
Electric Wirei
/WJ nd-ows
/Shelves
/Ci utches
^'Sears Table Saw
/£-u,,es 5' Boxes of Misc Auction Paraphernalia
/Wood Hitchen Cabinets
;Chairs to be reupholstered

i

rugs
Old S t e r e o s

00023;o

Notes

for Mary Joyce HALLS-1

1 Jan 1980
Doors S Door Molding
Shelves full of Building Materials
-^"*DFa\ger * M* ta 1 Ch^s t f ul^l^^fjjnuts ^^bjo 1 t s ^ ^screws ;:iji?l &c'J* 'fittings ^
'7*fctfa:£s^r^y^—e
tc / ~
" ~~"
vUasninq Machine
^Old Pro Sat Satellite Receiver
Coin p r e~sfso<r\
x/y^S^^Btr

B que

l/bo;; Full of Welding Rods
\iceramic Kiln
N/Numorous Heating * air conditioning units taken out of Old Motel
Metal Awnings
Garden Hoses
.
v/
uabjnet full of Garden' ChemicaTls* I^L
boxes of Metal Pipe fitting^
Sheets of limitation Marble
Luxes of misc. building materials
Old 1 lid' o Wave
Sac! 5 o f Cement
u m m u m Chaise Lounqe
\Zpox of set of canisters in J r e e n w a r e
^Mantle Clod' with domed glasss cov^r
(present from Linda & Pat) -fHlteJtH
Furnace (outside of basement door)
VEHICLES
1986 Chevrolet Celebrity^
v/1985 Oldsmobile "Fireni-a
</l984 Citation
Mustang.
Ford True I' A
Blue Station Wagon $
Yellow

Truck - ££% Lty^

~k $<> A*C

FARM EQUIPMENT
Red Tractor (From Parleyj) v ^ ? ^
2 John Deere Tractors
Attachments for tractors
Plow, Leveler etc.^
TOOLS IN OLD SEWING ROOM
Hack Saw^
t A Gc."l " B u c k e t 1 1 / 1 " f i n i s h n a i l s
1/1
o f 2 l b c o f f e e can s c r e w g u n s c r e w s
i gal bucket of f i n i s h n=iils
1/2 g a l w a l l p a p e r
sizing
hodal* s i g n e t : 3 5 mm Camera i n f i e J d c a s e
I o d ^ K o t a r y F l a s h H o l d e r w/ m i s c .
supplies
Mop bucl- e t w / s t j u e s z e r o l l e r s
S e a r ' s " C r a f t ^ m a ' n 7 3 n s r B e l"t~ S a n a e r ^ a n i ^ J ""Bel p.s
l %
^5V"i 1 "Z^P 1 'an e*' *H e V v y 'HjiTE^fofj
^^ "
10 U_oc I* s" ( i n b o x )*~~
_ M Ei crisis S c r e w s
1 1/2 F i n i s h n a i l s

0

Jan

1980

moling

Nails

' l a r t 1/4

Drill

Dbl

insulated

-anye 100' e l e c . extension cord
m y l case w/23 8 tracttapes
s a r s C r a f t s m a n 1 / 2 " S a b r e Saw

lacl- * D e c l e r 78 D r i l l

1/3 HP

7 s h e e t s fine
sandpaper
/ 2 o f 5 l b - bag i r o n C h e l a t e 138FE
/^Jjkach P l a y e r w i t h S p e a t erf
v
" h G 5 8 RF C a b l e (Coa:c i a l " c a b l e WPL259 C o n n e c t o r s )
ainh Roller with
roller
11
Roof Jacl»et
l s c o P d b - 2 6 - 2 / 0 - 2 Power d i s t B l o c l - ( 3 5 0 a m p . 6 0 0 V o l t s )
5 nhi?ets f i n e sandpaper
(H280)
ii'Jour L i g h t c o n t r a J
a-^UjGints

3 pole

block

00 Watt Ebo Jaeger Ac guar l urn ^Heaterg
LSC:/ " a c q u a n u m Supplied
uovoi- u acuum Clnr Bags Type C
;*pandable dryer- vent hose
old Bathroom Fi:; Lures
(shower, towel, towel brackets, w drawer pulls)
adjo ShacP Telephone
ears Craftsman Orbital Dual Motion Sander (Model 315M690) 40 amps.
l^cl- o Dec! er Finishing Sander 17404
ubiich hlec Staple bun (Model T-5-8)
•ayton Elec. Welder (Med. 2503TD)
overb Cu Pipe Gi lp (=»mall)
/8 Craftsman Scroller Saw (Mod.315-10721/
• lac I .? Deeper Jig Saw (7504-type 5)
lilwaul-eo Elec 7 1/4 Circular Saw i
(Heavy duty, worm drive (cat. tl-6377)
iammer .
/ tudsensgr
:patul3
it ^s =i Shears
arge Tin Snips
.4" Pipe Master'Pipe U'renchtf
Flam^^y^^^f^U-)

." Long

(
)rill lnde:c /
.arge Allen Wrench
/' wide half circle spatula
"uller 9/16 Crescent Wrench
lriannle Allen Wrench
I Square with Bubble level
iiin - T iri S h e a r s

•5ti.inley
•Jutland
J

"* Way J e v e l
Witherby Plane

p a t 111 -i -J

1 »"> K v i L O G r i p
D h e e t Reel' Saw
100' Round meas. t a p e ( s t a r t s a t
Haci' Saw
n
I r w i n Speedbo s e t o f 6
88"elec
fJire C u t t e r s i z e 10-22

Small

1 1/2 s p a t u l a

8)
drill

wood

bits

QQ023tJ

Notes
1

^

far Mary Joyce HALLb -1

Jar) 1980

rod RuTler Wallpaper Tool
~rt t^re^'up c \
25' Meal,. Tape
10' M(>as. Tape
~Fi~reT Pressure Gauge
2 Spool.s Soldering
DuLuh Pay Rosin Core Wire Solder
tira'ftsman Set Punc1^
2 wood Chisel
2 All en Wrenches
Flal *=crew drivers- 4 large, 1 stubby, 4 small
Mule Punch
2 Glas<.> Cutters
2 Utility 1 nives
3 Wire Cutlers
Flat head Pliers
J Plii*r
1 large wire cutler £• Fliers
7 20 amp. far fuse b„>,:es
4 Phillip Screw Drivers
Lang"" fangs
Large Square
Sheet Rock T Square
TOOLS ALREADY GIVEN TO GRANT
-'rotr^ctor

o'ed Wormwood Sw
Plumbing Snap e
Blaci- & Deeper Scrol Saw
Small Nail PullerLung Trowel
Roller £' cover
F j |jt- Wrench
Laige Pipe Wrench
F1Lsrs
Screw Drivers - 4 bla-le. 2 Phillips
Vice Grips
HciC.I' Saw
Spatulas - large & small
25' Measuring Tape
C^r pe c h u f e
Glass CutterWire Cutlers
Hand Flane
Wirt* Cutters large

00023^

APPENDIX "B

3RD DISTRICT COUR["-TOOELE

91* MAR-8 P H 3 ' l i 8

FILED BY

fy

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOYCE KNOWLDEN,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and
GRACE POLOSKEY,

Civil No. 934300096

Defendants.
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial
before the above-entitled court on January 20, 1994, at the hour of
9:00 a.m., the Honorable William A. Thorne, Third District Court
Judge, presiding, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and being
represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the Defendant,
Grant R. Knowlden, being present in person and being represented by
counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the Defendant, Grace Poloskey, being
present

in

person

and

being

represented

by

counsel, J.

Duke

Edwards, and the parties having been sworn and having testified and
having

presented

exhibits

and

evidence, and

the court

having

reviewed the Plaintiff's memorandum and heard the arguments of
counsel, and the court having previously entered its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and based thereon and good

cause

appearing therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from

Defendant, Grant R. Knowlden, the same to become final immediately.
2.
5(a)

Based upon the court's finding that under U.C.A. §25-6-

and

(b) , that

Defendant

Grant

R.

Knowlden

fraudulently

conveyed the Plaintiff's and Defendant Knowlden's marital residence
at

6000 North

Old

Lincoln Highway, Grantsville, Utah, to his

sister, Defendant Grace Poloskey, the court includes that property
in the marital estate for purposes of valuing the estate and that
asset.

Defendant Knowlden is hereby awarded the Plaintiff's and

Defendant's Knowlden's home and real property located at 6000 North
Old

Lincoln

Highway, Grantsville, Utah.

Plaintiff

is

hereby

awarded Plaintiff's and Defendant Knowlden's home and real property
located at 4801 South 4900 West, Kearns, Utah, and the Plaintiff's
and Defendant Knowlden's residence and real property located at 39
East Louise Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Each party is ordered to

execute and deliver any necessary documents to transfer the title
and ownership of the real property of the Plaintiff and Defendant
Knowlden as set forth above.
the

Lomas

Mortgage

Defendant Knowlden is ordered to pay

Company,

representing

mortgage on the Louise property.

the

current

second

Further, Defendant Knowlden is

ordered to transfer that mortgage from the Louise property so that
property

is

no

longer

encumbered

by

that

second

mortgage.

0002*5^

Plaintiff is ordered to pay the first mortgage owing to Lomas
Mortgage Company, which is currently an encumbrance on the Louise
property.
3.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the Firenza, the Cavalier,

and the Citation automobiles. Defendant Knowlden is hereby awarded
the Celebrity automobile, the Ford truck and the Ford mustang.
4.

The Plaintiff is hereby awarded her accounts at Key Bank,

Zions, Garfield Credit Union, Utah Central Credit Union, the Marcus
Knowlden note receivable and the debt owed by Ms. Eyre.

The

Defendant Knowlden is awarded the money accounts in his name.
5.

Defendant Knowlden is hereby awarded power equipment and

tools and farm equipment.
6.

Defendant Knowlden is hereby ordered to pay the debts

owing to Levitz, Bank One, property taxes for the Plaintiff's and
Defendant's properties, fire insurance owing on the Plaintiff's and
Defendant's properties, Utah State taxes owing by the Plaintiff and
Defendant and the debt to Shellie Eyre, which debts are in the
approximate total of $1,693.00.
7.

The Plaintiff

and Defendant are ordered to sell the

building materials located at the Grantsville property.

Defendant

Knowlden is ordered obtain two estimates from two separate as to
the

value of the property

and

arrange

for the sale of those

building materials to the highest bidder.

Plaintiff and Defendant

Knowlden are each awarded one-half of the proceeds.

3
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8.

Defendant Knowlden is hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff

permanent alimony in the sum of $400.00 per month.
9.

The personal property of the Plaintiff and Defendant

Knowlden shall be divided as set forth on Defendant Knowlden's
Exhibit 10, except for the disputed items which are to be awarded
as follows:
TO THE PLAINTIFF:

Small tables, candelabra and clock, washer

and dryer to Plaintiff, the screw gun, refrigerator in the
pantry, the dresser lamp, the large mixer, the sander, onehalf of the knives and the Kirby vacuum.
TO THE DEFENDANT:

Large tables, antique chair, the luggage,

refrigerator in kitchen, the pattern cabinets, the stained
glass grinder, one-half of the knives, and the vacuum.
10.

Defendant Knowlden is hereby awarded the Metropolitan

Life Insurance policy.
11.

Defendant Knowlden is hereby awarded all right, title and

interest in his Kennecott retirement.
12.

Each party is ordered to pay his or her own attorney's

fees and costs incurred.
13.

Defendant

Grant

R.

Knowlden

is

hereby

permanently

enjoined and restrained from coming around the Plaintiff at her
residence, from telephoning Plaintiff, or having any contact with
Plaintiff whatsoever.

Further, Defendant Grant R. Knowlden is

hereby permanently enjoined from harassing, annoying or physically
touching or abusing Plaintiff.

4
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14.

Plaintiff

is

ordered

to

remove

herself

from

Grantsville property no later than March 31, 1994.

the

Until the

Plaintiff removes herself from the Grantsville property, Defendant
Knowlden shall be permitted access to the property for the limited
purposes of the construction

of the

firewall pursuant to the

earlier court Order on Plaintiffs Motion in Re: Contempt.
15.

Defendant Knowlden is ordered to cooperate with Plaintiff

in providing Plaintiff with any and all documents necessary to
obtain information regarding the rental of the Kearns property,
including lease documents.
16.

Each

party

is

ordered

to

execute

and

deliver 'all

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
property of the parties pursuant to the decree entered in this
action.
DATED this j2_ day of

slcz^^C__

f

1994.

BY THE COURT

WILLIARA. THORNE
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JIMI MITSUNAGA
Attorney for Defendant Knowlden
DATED:

o

o^^^

o /

U^^A^T
J. DUKE EDWARDS
Counsel for Defendant
Dated:

OOOdiio

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY AND MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the Plaintiff herein, and that I caused
the attached DECREE OF DIVORCE to be served upon Defendants by
causing a true and correct copy of the same to be hand-delivered
to:
Jimi Mitsunaga
Attorney for Defendant Knowlden
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope
addressed to:
J. Duke Edwards
Attorney for Defendant Poloskey
4685 South Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84177
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-paid
thereon,
Salt Lake City, Utah on the
)n, in the United States mail at Sail

Oh d
av o
f
day
of

M
-efyEfTi'foi*/

, 1994,

Secretary

6
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f

9-4 HAY I7X1!0-.1»5
FILED BY- t
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #349 3
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOYCE KNOWLDEN,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff,
vs.
GRANT R. KNOWLDEN, and
GRACE POLOSKEY,

Civil No. 934300096

Defendants.

Judge William Thorne

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER, having come on regularly

for

hearing before the above entitled court on May 3, 1994, at the hour
of 10:30 a.m., the Honorable William Thorne, Third District Court
Judge

presiding,

on

Defendant's

Motion

for

New

Trial

and

Plaintiff's Response and Motion for Relief, and the Plaintiff being
present in person and being represented by counsel, Kellie F.
Williams, and the Defendant, Grant R. Knowlden, being present and
being represented by counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, and the court having
heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the files and

ooosio

memorandum contained therein, based thereon and for good cause
appearing, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied.

2.

Defendant is ordered to execute two quit claim deeds,

quit claiming the Louise Avenue and Kearns properties to Plaintiff.
Defendant refused to do so in open court and the court, therefore,
grants the Clerk of the Court, in and for Tooele County, State of
Utah, the authority to execute both quit claim deeds on behalf of
and in the stead of Grant R. Knowlden, and directs that the clerk
so execute those deeds, which are described as follows:
a.

Lot 17 & 18, Block 1, JOHNSON STATE STREET
SUBDIVISION,
according
to the
official
plat
thereof, recorded in the records of Salt Lake
County, Utah,

commonly known as 39 East Louise Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and;
b.

Lot 208 HOFFMAN HEIGHTS #6 SUBDIVISION, according
to the official plat thereof, recorded in the
records of Salt Lake County, Utah,

commonly known as 4801 South 4900 West, Kearns, Utah.
3.

That

should

the

Defendant

not

transfer

the

second

mortgage on the Louise property within two weeks, that issue may be
brought back before the court.
4.

That

the

issue

raised

by

Plaintiff

relating

to

the

building materials is reserved.
2
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5.

That Plaintiff's counsel is to direct letters to the

tenants in the two properties and provide to them a copy of the
Decree, instructing them to make payments henceforth directly to
Plaintiff.
6.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the Arabian Gelding acquired

by the parties during their marriage and the associated debt owing
to James Faris.
7.

Each party is to pay his or her own attorney's fees.

DATED this

r

r

day of

^

1994.

r^Psf

WILLIAM/^HORNE
District Court Judge

00031.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the Plaintiff herein, and that I caused
the

attached

ORDER

ON

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION

to

be

served

upon

Defendants by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an
envelope addressed to:
Jimi Mitsunaga
Attorney for Defendant
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
J. Duke Edwards
Attorney at Law
4685 South Highland Drive, #202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84177
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-paid
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
_ J j _ day of J '•,"i..

, 1994.

Secretary

00031,)

